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ENDING THE WAR AND SECURING
PEACE IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Philip J. Cohen, M.D.t
I. INTRODUCTION
The current war in former Yugoslavia from its outset has
been driven by Serbia's extremist nationalism and quest for ter-
ritorial expansion.1 As this tragedy has unfolded, the United
States, European Community, Helsinki Commission, and
United Nations have all concluded that Serbia bears the over-
whelming responsibility for the war and its consequences. 2
However, no policy has been crafted or implemented by any of
these entities that would effectively restrain the aggressive be-
havior of Serbia against her neighbors. Serbia's aggression has
introduced a potentially dangerous destabilization of post-Cold
War Europe, in a region in which Western Slavic, Eastern
Slavic, and Turkish cultures, Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy,
and Islam all converge in a delicate balance. Failure to contain
Serbian aggression endangers regional stability and threatens a
wider regional conflict.
A. Former Yugoslavia As a Precedent For Regional
Instability
In the land-grab by which Serbia is attempting to create an
ill-conceived, ethnically pure Greater Serbia, Serbs constitute
t Advisor for Policy and Public Affairs, UN Mission of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. BAL, New College, Sarasota, FL, 1975; M.D., University of Medicine and
Dentistry of New Jersey, 1983. Dr. Cohen has authored several articles analyzing
the character of this war. This work is substantially similar to Dr. Cohen's posi-
tion paper which was submitted to the Clinton-Gore transition team in early 1993.
'V.P. Gagnon, Jr., Yugoslavia: Prospects for Stability, FOREiGN AFF., Sum-
mer 1991, at 17-35.
2 Blaine Harden, EC Withdraws Ambassadors From Belgrade: Serbia Re-
buked Again on Bosnian War, WAsH. PoST, May 12, 1992, at A14; Harden, U.S.
Joins EC in Recalling Envoy From Belgrade, WASH. PoST, May 13, 1992, at A25;
Jeri Laber & Ivana Nizich, Milosevic's Land Grab, WASH. PoST, May 25, 1992,
(editorial) at A25; Chuck Sudetic, Observer's Blame Serb-Led Army for Escalating
War in Croatia, N.Y. Tud~s, Dec. 3, 1991, at A8.
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less than 40% of the population of this envisaged territory.3 In
pursuit of Greater Serbia, Serbs predictably would continue
their brutal policy of ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb popula-
tion, the only measure they have historically used to establish
control over newly conquered territories. "Ethnic cleansing," a
term introduced by the Serbs themselves, is a sanitized euphe-
mism for genocide and ethnic-based expulsion, and should be
read as such. Ironically, the UN has criticized Croatia, with its
war-shattered economy and over 750,000 refugees (over 500,000
from Bosnia), for not accepting more Bosnian refugees. 4 By de-
manding that Croatia accept more refugees rather than making
sure that Serbia stops creating them, it places the international
community in tacit complicity with the principal Serbian war
aim of territorial expansion by the expulsion of non-Serbs.5 No
European country has done more for the Bosnian refugees than
Croatia, and Croatia is among those least able to cope with this
burden economically.
If Serbia is not stopped in Bosnia, the aggression predict-
ably will extend to Kosovo and Macedonia, where ominous signs
point to the possibility of wider regional conflict.6 It is clearly
Serbia's intention to "ethnically cleanse" Kosovo, home to
nearly two million ethnic Albanians.7 This has been a Serbian
3 Christopher Cviic, Looking for Hope Beneath the Ashes, THE TABLET
(London), Aug. 15, 1992, at 1004.
4 Chuck Sudetic, U.N. Asks Croatia to Admit Bosnians, N.Y. Tnmms, Nov. 4,
1992, at A18.
6 John F. Burns, Sarajevans' Evacuation Ends in Sorrow, N.Y. TImEs, Nov.
11, 1992, at A10.
6 Stephen Kinzer, Ethnic Conflict Is Threatening in Yet Another Region of
Yugoslavia: Kosovo, N.Y. TunES, Nov. 9, 1992, at A8; John Burns, Free Macedonia
Faces Hostile World, N.Y. Tms, Apr. 1, 1992, at A15; Robert L. Keatley, Kosovo
Could Trigger a Balkan War, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1992, at A14.
7 Peter Maass, Serbians Pressing Ethnic Albanians In Uneasy Kosovo, WASH.
PosT, July 15, 1991, at A13. "In the last three years, tear gas, indiscriminate beat-
ings and killings, arrests of wounded people in hospitals, 85,000 ethnic Albanians
kicked out of their jobs and total control of schools, the press and food distribution
have become a way of life. Many Serbs, including Belgrade intellectuals, attach
monstrous crimes to the Albanians whom they consider subhumans, simians, cit-
ing in detail their lascivious overbreeding." Ken Danforth, Serbs Can't Wait To
Get at the Albanians, PmLA. INQI, June 3, 1992, at A15. See Michael T. Kaufman,
A Different Kind of War in Kosovo: Serbian Repression vs. Quiet Resistance, N.Y.
TmEs, June 23, 1992, at A10.
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aspiration for well over fifty years 8 In opposing the recognition
of Macedonia, Greece had expressed its "fear" that Yugoslav
Macedonia (although disarmed and with 20% the population of
Greece) intended to invade the northern Greek province called
Macedonia. Greek troops are deployed on the Yugoslav Mace-
donian border, and Greek military aircraft regularly over-fly
Yugoslav Macedonia. If Serbia and Greece finally execute their
agreement to divide Yugoslav Macedonia, which Serbia calls
"southern Serbia" and which Greece calls "the stolen jewels of
Greece," other countries may no longer feel constrained from in-
tervention. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey each have
ethnic minorities threatened directly by designs to create a
"Greater Serbia." Turkey, a traditional enemy of both Greece
and Serbia, has resisted unilateral military intervention pri-
marily because of Turkey's sensitivity towards integration with
the rest of Europe. Nevertheless, Turkey has grave concerns for
the endangered Muslim populations of Bosnia, Sandjak,
Kosova, and Macedonia, where ethnic Turks also reside. Bulga-
ria, a traditional enemy of Serbia, also has a significant ethnic
minority in Serbia as well as in Macedonia. The persecution of
over 350,000 Hungarians in the Vojvodina province of Serbia
has received relatively little attention, but evokes considerable
concern in Hungary.
The UN's recognition of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
coupled with the continuation of an arms embargo on these
states, has proven an incompetent exercise of authority. The
net effect has been to encourage one-sided Serbian aggression
by obstructing the self-defense of Muslims and Croats, even as
they are victims of genocide. Since September 1991, the U.S.,
EC, and later the UN, have interfered in the Balkans by inpos-
ing an arms embargo that extended to the victims of genocide
8 Vasa Cubrilovic, Iseijavanje Arnauta (Expulsion of Albanians] in Izvori ve-
likosrpske agresije. [Roots of Great Serbian Aggression] (Zagreb) (Boze Covic ed.
August, 1991), at 106-124. The late Mr. Cubrilovic [1897-19901, who was a polit-
ical adviser for the royalist Yugoslav government, originally presented The Expul-
sion of Albanians as a lecture to the Serbian Cultural Club on March 7, 1937, and
subsequently as a memorandum to the Yugoslav government. It is a blueprint for
rendering the lives of Albanians so intolerable and terror-filled that they will emi-
grate to Albania and Turkish lands. The original document is deposited in the
Military-Historical Institute of the Yugoslav People's Army in Belgrade: Archive of
the Royal Yugoslav Army, 2/4, Box 69. After World War H, Cubrilovic held several
posts in the Federal Yugoslav government.
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but have not intervened on the victims' behalf. With no serious
help ever offered to stop Serbian aggression, a power vacuum
has been created in the Balkans, with the opportunity for ter-
rorist states to extend their influence in the region.9 The recent
attempted shipment of arms from Iran'0 is evidence of the fail-
ure of the U.S., EC, and UN to stop Serbian aggression. This
policy has led to opportunistic involvement in the Balkan con-
flict and potentiates further destabilization of the region. Fur-
ther, the betrayal of these small countries has sent "a very clear
message to other small nations that they cannot count on prin-
ciples. They should forget democracy and the free market, and
arm themselves first."11 The U.S. and Europe are losing an his-
toric opportunity to strengthen the bridge of trust between the
Muslim world and the West.12 The willingness of the U.S. to
use force in Iraq but not in former Yugoslavia is straining alli-
ances with Turkey, Egypt, and other Middle East allies.'3 Is-
lam, with one billion followers, will long remember, as a
seminal event of their modern history, the relative indifference
of Europeans and Americans towards the genocide against the
Bosnian Muslims.
In the former Soviet Union, in which over 160 ethnicities
reside and where four republics possess nuclear weapons, there
remains significant potential for multiple armed conflicts over
borders. Russia has keenly noted the non-response of the West
to Serbia's program of "ethnic cleansing," in flagrant violation
of the Geneva Conventions. Despite Yeltsin's recognition of the
independence of the Baltic republics, many Russian factions re-
tain aspirations to control the strategic Baltic ports. To leave
Serbian expansionism unchallenged would encourage those
9 Douglas Jehl, Iranian Effort to Send Bosnia Arms Reported, L.A. TzIES,
Sept. 10, 1992, at Al.
10 Id.
11 Barbara Crossette, Bosnia, Fearing Ethnic Partition, Will Propose 4 Local
Authorities, N.Y. TmiEs, Aug. 20, 1992, at Al (quoting Bosnian Foreign Minister
Hars Silajdzic).
12 Kim Murphy, Islamic World Galvanized by Reported Killing of Bosnia's
Muslims, Deplores Inaction by UN, L.A. Tmns, Aug. 14, 1992, at A5; Gerald F.
Seib, Split Between Islam and West Widens Because of Crisis in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, WAiL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1992, at A4.
13 Jackson Diehl, Contrast in U.S. Policies Is Straining Alliances: Double
Standard Seen in Bosnia, Iraq, WASH. PosT, Sept. 19, 1992, at A17.
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Russian elements. 14 Indeed, Russian troops are still positioned
in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The economic and political
situation in Russia is volatile, and there is the risk that Yelt-
sin's fragile democracy may be replaced by ultra-nationalistic
elements. These elements may attempt to re-establish Russia's
influence in the Balkans by support of Serbian war efforts.
B. A Rational Strategy For Attaining Peace
A meaningful political solution to the war in former Yugo-
slavia will first require the military defeat of Serbian aggres-
sion and the end of Serbia's unchallenged military superiority.
The first step should be to lift the arms embargo on Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina and permit those republics to defend them-
selves in accordance with international law and the UN charter.
This step would obviate the need for any foreign ground troops
and should terminate the debate on which foreign country
should send troops to former Yugoslavia. If they were to pos-
sess adequate weaponry, ground forces under the command of
the legitimate governments of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
could successfully reverse Serbia's land-grab. It should be
noted that Serb fighting forces have prevailed on the basis of
superior arms. However, the wide swathes of territory they
hold are thinly defended by irregular forces with questionable
motivation. By undertaking strategic air strikes, a relatively
low-risk operation, as enunciated by Margaret Thatcher,15
Jeane Kirkpatrick, 16 and others,17 the international community
could greatly shorten the conflict. Air strikes would accomplish
several well circumscribed, but vital goals: 1) the grounding of
Serbia's air power by the bombardment of radar stations and
airfields, a total of approximately one dozen targets; 2) the sev-
ering of military supply lines from Serbia to Bosnia-Herzego-
14 Paul Goble, Serbians' Success Echoes in Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992,
(editorial), at A23. Mr. Goble is a former State Department specialist on Soviet
nationalities and is currently a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
15 Margaret Thatcher, Stop the Excuses. Help Bosnia Now, N.Y. Tmms, Aug.
6, 1992, (editorial), at A23.
16 Jeane Kirkpatrick, The Only Way to Stop Aggression, WASH. PoST, Aug. 3,
1992, (editorial), at A19.
17 Leslie H. Gelb, Foreign Affairs; The West's Scam In Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 1992, (editorial), at E17; George D. Kenney, Bosnia - Appeasement in Our
2Yme, WASH. PosT, Aug. 30, 1992, (editorial), at C7.
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vina and Croatia by the bombardment of bridges over the Drina
River, across which personnel and supplies currently flow to
Serbian forces; and 3) the destruction of munitions plants
within Serbia. In addition, the steady flow of oil and strategic
supplies to Serbia from Russia, Ukraine, and Romania via the
Danube River must be firmly blockaded.
The current practice of forcing the victims of Serbian ag-
gression to negotiate with their tormentors, while keeping the
victims weak through an arms embargo, is morally reprehensi-
ble and politically unwise, and serves only to reward Serbia's
aggression by legitimizing ill-gotten war gains. Predictably, it
will also have the effect of creating the context for continued
fighting, as the dispossessed struggle to recover their territo-
ries. Serb-occupied territories must be returned to the control
of their legitimate governments, before negotiations are under-
taken. Following the restoration of the territorial integrity of
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, internationally-sponsored
peace negotiations can address several problems: 1) the rights
and security of all ethnicities and minorities must be guaran-
teed; 2) refugees must be permitted and assisted to return
safely to their rightful homes, where many dwellings need to be
rebuilt; and 3) war crimes trials for violators on all sides must
be undertaken, to underscore the seriousness of the world com-
munity's commitment to human rights.
C. Conclusion
It is abundantly clear that Serbia and Serbian forces bear
the overwhelming responsibility for the violence and atrocities
which have characterized this one-sided aggression. This war
could have been prevented if, from the outset, the international
community had given clear support to the aspiring democracies,
rather than favoring the communist regime, which sought to re-
press them. Instead, incompetent international maneuvering
by the EC and the U.S. has had the net effect of encouraging
Serbian aggression and weakening Serbia's victims. By freez-
ing the military imbalance in favor of the aggressor, the ill-con-
ceived arms embargo, imposed on all of what was once
Yugoslavia, undoubtedly has had its greatest impact on Serbia's
victims, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most incomprehensi-
bly, the embargo has been retained on the victims, even after
[Vol. 6:19
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their independence and sovereignty was internationally recog-
nized, in mockery of the UN charter. The slow and ineffectual
response to Serbia's aggression, coming only months after the
highly coordinated response to Iraq's aggression, has mocked
the concept of a New World Order in which "aggression will not
stand." Thus, the Islamic world, horrified by the systematic ex-
termination and expulsion of Muslims under the watch of the
U.S., EC, and UN, is skeptical of Western principles of justice.
In light of the West's failure, Muslim countries are now re-eval-
uating their own option and obligation to stop the slaughter and
brutality in Bosnia.
The challenge remains to stop Serbia's aggression to pre-
vent a larger international conflict and to affirm the West's
commitment to the rule of international law. Former Yugosla-
via is not Vietnam, Lebanon, or Northern Ireland. The more
appropriate analogy is Adolf Hitler and Saddam Hussein: a
ruthless aggressor seeking territorial aggrandizement and em-
ploying genocide to accomplish his end. The crisis in former Yu-
goslavia has epitomized the choice between the paths of Neville
Chamberlain and Winston Churchill. The Churchillian path
has thus far been avoided, to the shame and disgrace of those
who have presumed to lead.
1994]
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II. APPENDIX
A. Background
Initially, Slovenia and Croatia did not seek their constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to secession,' but rather a greater de-
gree of cultural, political, and economic autonomy within a
Yugoslav confederation, permitting democracy and a free-mar-
ket economy. Instead, Serbia and its ally Montenegro de-
manded the preservation of centralized communist authority.
The confederal proposal was rejected by Serbian president
Slobodan Milosevic, who controlled 4 of the 8 votes in the fed-
eral presidency.19 Plebiscites were subsequently held, and in
democratic open elections, 94% of Croatian and 88% of Slove-
nian voters chose independence.20 In June, 1991, the Yugoslav
Army attacked Slovenia, but met a humiliating defeat by the
armed and prepared Slovenian Territorial Defenses.21 Slove-
nia, the most economically productive republic, with its homo-
geneous population of two million (96% Slovenian), contained
virtually no Serb minority and shared no common border with
Serbia. The Serbian leadership in the Yugoslav government
later conceded Slovenia's secession from Yugoslavia, 22 which
18 Gagnon, supra note 1.
'9 The eight votes within the federal presidency of Yugoslavia were derived
from six republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia,
and Slovenia) and two autonomous regions (Kosova and Vojvodina) within Serbia.
In 1989, Serbian authorities dissolved the legislatures of both autonomous regions,
but retained their votes in the federal presidency. Thus, Serbia directly controlled
three of eight votes. Montenegro and Serbia, voting in a block, effectively con-
trolled four of eight votes, frequently deadlocking the federal presidency.
20 Chuck Sudetic, Croatia Votes for Sovereignty and Confederation, N.Y.
Tims, May 20, 1991, at A3. More than 86% of eligible voters participated. Repub-
lic of Slovenia, Republic of Slovenia - 1990. Chronicle of Slovenian Year of Seces-
sion in Words and Pictures, 1991, at 175. According to these data, 93.2% of all
eligible voters participated; 88.2% supported independence; 4% opposed indepen-
dence; and 7.8% of votes were not valid.
21 Jim Fish, Yugoslav Army Upended in Slovenia. Takeover Begun Leisurely
Becomes Albatross for Privileged Force, WASH. PosT, July 2, 1991, at Al. 'he
overconfident army generals, thinking they would subdue Slovenia's Territorial
Defense Force within hours, sent fewer than 100 tanks to seize Slovenia's 27 major
border crossing points.... The tanks were crewed mainly by young draftees whose
supplies of food and fuel soon ran out." Blaine Harden, Slovenia Nears Indepen-
dence as Croatia Faces Civil War: Slovenes See Army Pullout as Key Step to Free-
dom, WAsH. PosT, July 20, 1991, at Al; Robert Marquand, Yugoslav Accords
Bring Calm to Slovenia's Capital, Cmus'N Sci. MorroR, July 2, 1991, at 3.
22 Harden, supra note 21.
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would have left Serbia with 4 of 7 votes in the federal
presidency.
Croatia, a republic of 4.5 million, including 600,000 ethnic
Serbs (11.5%), was of fundamental strategic interest to Bel-
grade. Croatia contains the most productive oil fields of Yugo-
slavia (in eastern Slovenia, especially in the vicinity of
Vukovar). Croatia, occupying most of the Adriatic coast of Yu-
goslavia, possessed valuable commercial seaports, with rail
links to central and eastern Europe. Croatia's tourist industry
alone generated 50% of Yugoslavia's hard currency, which was
routed to the Belgrade-controlled Yugoslav bank. Serbia, by
contrast, was oil-poor, land-locked, and economically dependent
on Croatia and Slovenia, especially on Croatia.
Preparations for war against Croatia began long before
1991. As early as 1986, the "Memorandum" of the Serbian
Academy of Arts and Sciences delineated the rationale for join-
ing all lands with Serbian minorities into one large Serbian
state, with the sole concern being the "minority rights" of Serbs.
Overt military preparations for war began in 1989. Under pres-
sure from the Yugoslav Army, the disarmament of the Croatian
Territorial Defense Force, which had begun in the fall of 1989,
was nearly completed by May, 1990, when Croatia held elec-
tions. 3 Croatia's preparedness against military attack was fur-
ther reduced, when Croatia demobilized its police in January
1991 in response to threats of attack by the Yugoslav Army if
weapons were not surrendered.24 Concurrently, Serbian irreg-
ular forces covertly supported by Serbia escalated their armed
attacks on Croatian civilians. The Serbian-dominated Yugoslav
Army "intervened" in the conflicts on the pretext of separating
23 Croatia and Slovenia, both attacked by the Yugoslav Army, fared very dif-
ferently. Slovenia, with no significant Serb minority, had retained control over 50-
70% of the military materinl of its Territorial Defense Force. Slovenia faced no
Serb insurgency, and the Yugoslav Army was unprepared. In contrast, Croatia
had a significant Serb minority, which mobilized quickly as an insurgency, with
the support of the Yugoslav Army and Serbian leadership. Eighty percent of the
materiel of the Croatian Territorial Defense Force was appropriated by the Yugo-
slav Army, which, in turn, supplied weapons to Serbian insurgents.
24 Harden, Croatia Charges Army Shadows Its Officials. Police Arming for
Showdown with Serbia, WASH. PosT, Jan. 19, 1991, at A10; "In early December
[1990], the federal minister of defense threatened to use force to take weapons
away from police and local militia in Croatia and Slovenia." Harden, Yugoslav
Pact Averts Threatened Civil War, WAsu. PosT, Jan. 27, 1991, at A14.
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warring sides, but systematically assured a series of victories
for the Serbian irregular forces. 25 Serbian leaders calculated
that Croatia's resistance would quickly be crushed in a battle
that might cause thousands of deaths and that international
censure, a small price to pay, would be a temporary inconven-
ience.26 Without declaring war, Serbia launched a massive mil-
itary assault and seized over 35% of Croatian territory. Parts of
eastern Slavonia and provinces which Serbs call Krajina 27 be-
came "Kroatenfrei."2 8 The pretext for such a brutal military in-
vasion was to protect the endangered Serb minority in Croatia,
but in truth, three-quarters of Croatia's 600,000 ethnic Serbs
lived outside of the lands which Serb forces seized.29 The begin-
ning of the war against Croatia was the end of Yugoslavia's con-
stitutionally legitimate central government. The federal
presidency, with constitutional authority over the Yugoslav
25 Jim Fish, Yugoslavia Sends Troops to Croatia. Local Police Clash With
Demonstrators, WASH. PosT, Mar. 3, 1991, at A20; "There is ample evidence that
Serbian fighters [in Croatia] are receiving clandestine support and equipment
from Serbian officers in the Yugoslav Federal Army. The officers corps in the Yu-
goslav Federal Army are dominated by Serbs. At camp headquarters, the com-
mander reads positions from detailed, Yugoslav Army topographical maps.
Soldiers wear crisp, new camouflage uniforms' identical to those worn by the spe-
cial forces of the federal army. Local officials say they were provided by federal
army officers." Mary Battiata, Serbian Guerrilla Camps Operate Inside Croa-
tia... Serbs Train Inside Croatia for Civil War, WASH. PoST, July 22, 1991, at Al;
"Officials of Serbia say their republic has been directly aiding rebellions by Serbs
in Croatia." Stephen Engelberg, Serbia Sending Supplies to Compatriots in Croa-
tia, N.Y. Tnws, July 27, 1991, at A3.
26 "General Blogoje Adzic, Chief of Yugoslavia's general staff was quoted:
'Even if there has to be a thousand deaths, the outside world will not intervene to
back the two secessionist republics against the federal army led mainly by Serbian
officers'." Andrew Borowiec, General Wants to Punish Croats, WAsH. Tns, July
4, 1991, at Al; "Following the invasion of Slovenia, Yugoslav General Adzic, a key
military strategist, stated, 'This rebellion must be terminated, even if it is going to
generate a thousand deaths. The international community will be agitated a bit,
but three days later everything will be forgotten and our objectives will be ob-
tained'." Jian Paolo Rossetti and Gigi Zazzeri, Here Are The New Warlords,
EuROPEO (Italy), July 19, 1991, no. 29, at 22.
27 Krajina, meaning 'border', refers to the Croatian military border. These
Croatian lands, apposing territories of the Ottoman empire, were administered
from Graz, Austria. The military border was disarmed in 1873 and legally dis-
banded in 1881. LE KoN, ZAGREE: JuGOsLAvFNsK LmsnOoGRAFSI ZAVOD, 1974,
at 1056.
28 Cviic, supra note 3, at 1003.
29 "The largest concentrations of Serbs in the republic are in heartland cities
like Zagreb.... " John Tagliabue, Serbs in Croatian Cities are Quiet and Invisible,
N.Y. Tnmzs, Sept. 6, 1991, at A14.
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Army, proved impotent to constrain the Serbian offensive and
soon collapsed.30
For several months, however, the U.S. and EC continued to
support the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.3 1 An ill-con-
ceived arms embargo imposed by the EC, U.S., and UN on all
the republics of former Yugoslavia 32 froze the military imbal-
ance in favor of Serbia, which effectively controlled the entire
arsenal of the Yugoslav Army (tanks, ships, fighter planes, and
heavy artillery).3 3 The former Yugoslav government itself,
dominated by Serbs, petitioned for this embargo.3 4 Predictably,
the lack of international involvement to stop initial Serbian ad-
vances provided time for Serbia to conquer more Croatian terri-
tory,35 severely damage the Croatian economy,3 6 and inflict
great human losses.
Bosnia-Herzegovina at first pursued a cautious path, trying
to avoid a confrontation with Belgrade.3 7 Encouraged by the
EC, Bosnia-Herzegovina, a republic of 4.3 million, conducted a
plebiscite on independence in February 1992. Most of the Serbs
of Bosnia-Herzegovina boycotted this vote under the direction of
30 Jim Fish, Serbia Keeps Croatian From Top Post. Deadlock of Collective
Presidency Adds to Yugoslav Turmoil, WASH. POST, May 16, 1991, at A27;
Celestine Bohlen, New Crisis Grips Yugoslavia Over Rotation of Leadership, N.Y.
Tnms, May 16, 1991, at Al.
31 Chuck Sudetic, Yugoslav Battles Rage on Eve of Talks, N.Y. Tmqus, Nov. 5,
1991, at A3; Laura Silber, Serbs, Croats Press War of Words, Guns, WASH. PoST,
Nov. 6, 1991, at A26; David Binder, Unified Yugoslavia Goal of U.S. Policy, N.Y.
Tm Es, July 1, 1991, at A6; Binder, U.S. Voices Regret on Yugoslav Crisis: Plans to
Ignore the Secession Attempts by Croatian and Slovenian Republics, N.Y. TarEs,
June 27, 1991, at A10.
32 John M. Goshko, U.N. Imposes Arms Embargo on Yugoslavia, WASH. POST,
Sept. 26, 1991, at Al.
33 Harden, Yugoslav Army Attacks Slovenia, Meets Resistance at Border Posts,
WASH. PosT, June 28, 1991, at Al.
34 Marian Houk, UN Backs Yugoslav Call for Embargo, CmusTL'z Sc. Mom-
TOR, Sept. 27, 1991, at P4.
35 Europe: The Sense of a Senseless War, THE EcoNoMIsT (London), Nov. 23,
1991, (editorial), at 53.
36 Harden, Yugoslavia's Tensions Kill Croatian Tourism: Serbs Accused of
Sabotaging Travel Industry, WASH. PoSr, June 15, 1991, at A17; Eric Bourne, Eth-
nic Violence Exacts Heavy Economic Toll in Yugoslavia, CHRmTLAN Sci. MONITOR,
Sept. 6, 1991, at 7.
37 Harden, Bosnia-Herzegovina on the Brink. Yugoslav Republic Seeks to
Steer Clear of Ethnic Carnage by Showing Political Flexibility, WASH. PosT, Jan.
15, 1992, at A17; see also Laura Silber, Bosnian Leaders Seek to Halt Serb.Croat
Fighting, WASH. PoST, Mar. 28, 1992, at A18.
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Belgrade,3 8 although Serbs there had no legitimate claim of dis-
crimination or persecution.3 9 Despite attempts of armed Serbs
to block the voting,40 65% of citizens participated, and more
than 99% of those voting chose independence. 41 Shortly after,
in April, 1992, both the EC and U.S. recognized the sovereignty
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, along with Slovenia and Croatia,
became a full member of the UN in May 1992. Despite Bosnia's
warm international welcome, however, the EC took no action to
prevent or halt the subsequent Serbian attack on Bosnia. Only
after Serbia's aggression had produced 600,000 Bosnian refu-
gees did the EC follow the U.S. initiative to impose economic
sanctions on Serbia.42 However, the hesitation of the EC and
its unwillingness to sanction force against Serbia emboldened
Serbian attacks. Bosnia itself remained under an arms em-
bargo which was inherited from an earlier arms embargo on the
whole territory of Yugoslavia. In this way, the U.S. and EC not
only disregarded Article 51 of the UN Charter, which obliged
the use of all necessary means to halt the aggression against a
member state, but also denied Bosnians the right to defend
themselves. Although Serbs constituted 31% of the population,
Serb forces engaged in "ethnic cleansing" against Muslims and
Croats soon controlled 70% of Bosnian territory.43
Macedonia is a republic of 2.1 million people, consisting of
64% Slavic Macedonians and several other ethnicities, includ-
ing ethnic Albanians, Bulgarians, Gypsies, Serbs, and Turks.
Macedonia's plebiscite overwhelmingly affirmed the republic's
determination for independence, 44 and Macedonia fulfilled the
same criteria for recognition by the EC as Bosnia-Herzego-
38 Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki
Commission]: The Referendum on Independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina: February
29-March 1, 1992, (March 12, 1992) at 12. [hereinafter Referendum on
Independence].
39 John F. Burns, Bosnian Strife Cuts Old Bridges of Trust - Ancient Ties of
Coexistence Are Broken by Ethnic Purification, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1992, at Al.
40 Referendum on Independence, supra note 38, at 18.
41 Silber, supra note 31.
42 Henry Kamm, Yugoslav Refugee Crisis Europe's Worst Since '40's, N.Y.
TnMs, July 24, 1992, at Al.
4 Yugoslavia: The Question of Intervention, Hearings, Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., (1992).
44 About 75% of the 1.3 million eligible voters participated, with about three-
quarters choosing independence. John Tagliabue, Macedonians Vote for Indepen-
dence from Yugoslavia, N.Y. TndEs, Sept. 10, 1991, at Al.
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vina.45 However, international recognition was blocked by
Greece, on the pretext that Macedonia, by retaining its centu-
ries-old name, was signaling its aspirations to the northern
province of Greece of the same name.46 The Serbian-controlled
Yugoslav Army withdrew from Macedonia to fight in Bosnia
and left Macedonia essentially disarmed.47 Although Serbia
has been under international sanctions and diplomatic isola-
tion, Greece cultivated warmer diplomatic ties to Serbia and
was the first country to be caught in a large violation of the UN
sanctions against Serbia.48 Greece remains a major violator of
the economic embargo against Serbia and Montenegro.49 Both
Greece and Serbia have made extensive use of embargoes
against Macedonia, blocking oil, food, and medicine.50 It seems
just a matter of time before Serbia and Greece execute their
plan to divide Macedonia, which Serbia calls "southern Serbia"
and which Greece calls "the stolen jewels of Greece."
In the former autonomous region of Kosovo, the nearly two
million ethnic Albanians, comprising over 90% of the popula-
tion, are in grave and imminent danger. In 1989, Serbian au-
thorities dissolved the legitimate parliament of Kosovo, an
unprecedented act in recent European history. Under Serbian
pressure, Yugoslav authorities imposed military occupation and
a system of apartheid characterized by expropriations of Alba-
nian property, forced expulsions, mass firings of ethnic Albani-
ans, political imprisonment, and political murders. Serbia has
clearly stated the intention to "ethnically cleanse" Albanians
from Kosovo. A small Croatian minority of Kosovo suffers from
the same repression as the Albanian majority.
The former autonomous region of Vojvodina, consisting of
lands that traditionally belonged to Hungary and Croatia, is the
45 "It is not because Macedonia fails to meet modem tests of statehood.
Among the six former republics of collapsed Yugoslavia, it has the highest scores.
It respects human rights and tolerates dissent. It controls its own borders and its
constitution forbids claims on its neighbors land." Harden, In Europe: New World
Order vs. Old Nationalism, WASH. PosT, June 10, 1992, at A25.
46 Alan Riding, Europe Nods to Bosnia, Not Macedonia, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7,
1992, at A3.
47 Harden, supra note 45.
48 Id.
49 Michael Wines, U.S. Says Greek Shipping Lines Are Violating Yugoslav
Embargo, N.Y. TwiEs, Nov. 18, 1992, at A14.
50 Burns, supra note 5.
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most ethnically heterogeneous province of former Yugoslavia,
with dozens of ethnicities. Among its two million inhabitants,
more than 350,000 ethnic Hungarians and some 200,000 Croats
are subject to severe persecution and expulsions. As in Kosovo,
the parliament of Vojvodina was dissolved and replaced by Ser-
bian authority in 1989.
In summary, the essential cause of the war in former Yugo-
slavia has been extremist Serbian nationalism, with an agenda
of territorial expansion. Serbs usurped the political machinery
and military hardware of the former Yugoslav federal govern-
ment for their plan to create Greater Serbia, a centuries-old
Serbian aspiration.
B. The U.S. Role in Catalyzing and Sustaining Serbian
Aggression
One-sided U.S. support for a centralized communist Yugo-
slavia encouraged this war from the outset. Secretary of State
James Baker chastised both Slovenia and Croatia for their
moves towards independence and flatly stated that a "cold wel-
come" awaited these republics if they left Yugoslavia. Just days
before the invasion of Slovenia, in June 1991, Baker visited Bel-
grade and assured its government that the U.S. was committed
to the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.5 ' The Belgrade gov-
ernment dominated by Serbian nationalists interpreted this
message as a "green light" for the military invasion of the de-
mocracy-seeking secessionist republics. Immediately after this
invasion, the administration expressed concern that Hungary,
Romania, Greece, or Albania could be drawn into the conflict,
but that the U.S. role in this explosive crisis would be only to
advise and advocate the preservation of the unity of
Yugoslavia.5 2
From the outset, the U.S. ceded leadership of the resolution
of the Yugoslav crisis to the EC.53 Having done so, the U.S.
shaped the framework in which the EC was to operate: 1) rejec-
61 David Hoffman, Baker Urges Yugoslavs to Keep Unity, WASH. PoST, June
22, 1991, at Al.
52 Goshko, U.S. Opposes Using Force to Keep Yugoslavia United, WASH. POST,
June 27, 1991, at A36.
53 Lawrence Freedman, Order and Disorder in the New World, FOREiGN AFF.,
Winter, 1992, at 33.
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tion of independent, democratically elected governments; 2) an
arms embargo on both the heavily armed aggressor as well as
the disarmed victims of aggression; 3) no U.S. support for mili-
tary intervention. The intrinsic flaw of placing this crisis under
EC guidance could have been anticipated from the beginning,
since EC decisions required unanimous consensus, rendering
the formulation of policy slow, inefficient, and ineffective. De-
spite the self-congratulations of the Europeans over their initial
mediation efforts, 54 Serbian aggression steadily escalated.
Even when the U.S. denounced Serbia as the aggressor in Sep-
tember 1991, 5 the accompanying message was that the U.S.,
finding no strategic interest, would not militarily intervene to
stop the killing. At the same time, the EC also announced that
it was not prepared for military intervention.56 Encouraged by
these announcements rejecting military intervention, Serbia
further escalated attacks on civilians in Croatia.57 In Novem-
ber 1991, when the U.S. joined the EC in economic sanctions
against Serbia, President Bush expressed doubt that sanctions,
including a proposed oil embargo, would end the war.5s The
U.S., however, offered no further alternatives.
Larger geopolitical considerations may explain why the
U.S., from the outset, favored the status quo of the communist
regime in former Yugoslavia in preference to supporting the
democratic aspirations of the majority of its people. At that
time, three Baltic republics of the Soviet Union were also seek-
ing independence. Gorbachev, seeing the dissolution of Yugo-
slavia as a precedent for the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
vigorously opposed the secession of Slovenia and Croatia. Since
d6tente with the Soviet Union was then an over-riding concern
54 "Leaders of the European Community today hailed their intervention in
Yugoslavia's civil war as evidence of a new era in which they are prepared to
launch bold initiatives to resolve troubles on their own continent and are less in-
clined to await guidance from the United States." William Drozdiak, Europeans
Laud Their Efforts in Yugoslavia, WASH. PosT, June 30, 1991, at A20.
55 Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. Policy on Yugoslavia Shifts to Curbing Serbs,
N.Y. TXms, Sept. 27, 1991, at A6.
56 Drozdiak, Lack of an Armed Option Limits EC's Yugoslav Peace Initiative,
WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1991, at A23.
57 Harden, Yugoslav Tanks Roll Into Croatia, WAH. PosT, Sept. 21, 1991, at
Al.
58 Ann Devroy, Bush Backs Yugoslav Sanctions, WASH. PoSr, Nov. 10, 1991,
at A39.
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of U.S. policy, it was not surprising that the U.S. supported
Gorbachev in opposing independence bids in both the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia. However, justification for discouraging
the democracy and independence seeking Yugoslav republics
came to an end with the breakup of the Soviet Union late in
1991. The world changed quickly, but U.S. policy remained un-
changed, even as Serbia's indiscriminate attacks upon civilians
escalated.5 9 Moreover, when the EC finally did achieve the deli-
cate consensus to recognize the independence of Slovenia and
Croatia, the U.S. actively campaigned against recognition, un-
dermining the European initiative. In November 1991, the EC
imposed economic sanctions on Yugoslavia, but in early Decem-
ber, these sanctions were lifted on all republics except Serbia
and Montenegro.60 Only days after the Europeans made their
sanctions selective against the aggressors and removed sanc-
tions from the victims, the U.S. imposed sanctions against all of
Yugoslavia, in an action uncoordinated with the EC.6 1
Despite reluctantly recognizing Slovenia, Croatia, and Bos-
nia-Herzegovina in early April 1992,62 and despite clearly label-
ing Serbia as the aggressor, 63 the U.S. did not significantly
reformulate its Balkan policy. For a brief period thereafter, the
U.S. assumed a more active role, threatening to suspend Yugo-
slav membership in the Commission on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, (CSCE) and to suspend future U.S. aid to
Serbia.64 Serbia responded by launching a major offensive. 65
Three weeks later, however, the U.S. announced it was with-
drawing in "anger and frustration" with "no policy... other than
to follow the lead of the European Community." 66 As Serb
59 Stephen Kinzer, Europe, Backing Germans, Accepts Yugoslav Breakup,
N.Y. TnMs, Jan. 16, 1992, at A10.
60 Silber, EC Lifts Yugoslav Sanctions, Excepts Serbia, Montenegro, WASH.
POST, Dec. 3, 1991, at A9.
61 Norman Kempster, U.S. Slaps New Sanctions on Yugoslavia As War Rages,
LA Tumds, Dec. 7, 1991, at A4.
62 Binder, U.S. Recognizes 3 Yugoslav Republics as Independent, N.Y. TimEs,
Apr. 8, 1992, at A10.
63 Harden, U.S. Joins EC in Recalling Envoy From Belgrade, supra note 2.
64 Hoffinan, U.S. Urges Europe To Protect Bosnia, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1992,
at Al.
65 Harden, Serbia Seems Unmoved By Western Warnings, WASH. Posr, Apr.
17, 1992, at A25.
66 Binder, U.S., Frustrated, Backs Off From the Crisis in Yugoslavia, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 5, 1992, at A10.
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forces achieved major advances in "ethnically cleansing" Bos-
nian territory during the succeeding weeks, this U.S. non-policy
drew criticism from a wide political spectrum, including Jeane
Kirkpatrick,67 Anthony Lewis,68 and William Saire.6 9 The ad-
ministration soon announced limited diplomatic, political, and
economic sanctions against Belgrade.70 Much stronger rhetoric
came days later, as Mr. Baker implied that "cleansing opera-
tions" by Serbian forces were reminiscent of Nazism. Invoking
Chapter VII of the UN charter, previously used as a framework
for the Persian Gulf War, Baker pointedly suggested the possi-
bility of U.S. participation in a multinational military force.
Furthermore, he assailed the EC for "looking for reasons not to
act, or arguing somehow that action in the face of this kind of
nightmare is not warranted at this time."71 Although Mr.
Baker appeared to have enunciated a cogent policy, the admin-
istration remained divided on the question of military
involvement. 72
The test of the seriousness of Mr. Baker's rhetoric came less
than two months later. At the July 1992 CSCE meeting in Hel-
sinki, when several Western countries indicated willingness to
intervene militarily, President Bush declined to support this in-
itiative. Moreover, when the Bosnian president pleaded di-
rectly with President Bush for military intervention to stop the
slaughter of civilians, Bush refused.73 Rather, he characterized
the murder of tens of thousands of civilians and the expulsion of
over two million people from their homes as a "hiccough" in the
New World Order, and concluded that the U.S. cannot respond
to every such situation. This stance betrayed a paucity of in-
67 Jeane Kirkpatrick, Folding in the Face of Violence, WAsH. PosT, May 18,
1992, (editorial), at A21.
68 Anthony Lewis, The New World Order, N.Y. Tbnms, May 17, 1992, (edito-
rial), at E17.
69 William Safire, Punish the Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1992, (editorial), at
A29.
70 Barbara Crossette, After Weeks of Seeming Inaction, U.S. Decides to Punish
Belgrade, N.Y. Tns, May 23, 1992, at 1.
7' Don Oberdorfer, Baker Urges U.N. To Sanction Serbs, WASH. PoS, May 25,
1992, at Al.
72 Barton Gellman, Administration is Sharply Divided On Whether to Expand
Balkan Role, WASH. PosT, July 9, 1992, at A19.
73 Don Oberdorfer and Mark Fisher, Bush Turns Aside Bosnian Plea for Mili.
tary Intervention, WASH. PoS, July 10, 1992, at A13.
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sight into the kind of principled leadership required to create
the climate in which international aggression finds no
opportunity.
A heightened moral and political imperative for interven-
tion came in early August 1992, when the existence of Serbian
concentration camps was revealed. The State Department,
although condemning atrocities, again ruled out military inter-
vention.74 When an outraged public and bipartisan group of
senators demanded a forceful response to these atrocities,
which appeared to be taking on the characteristics of the Nazi
extermination of Jews, 75 the administration responded by re-
versing its position from the previous day and questioning the
existence of the concentration camps, 76 even as video footage of
the camps was shown on national television that very day.
However, after a public outcry which followed the media pres-
entation of thousands of men, women, and children in concen-
tration camps, President Bush denounced ethnic cleansing and
suggested a shift towards the use of force limited to the delivery
of humanitarian aid.77 By narrowly defining U.S. goals, how-
ever, President Bush was apparently seeking to limit any U.S.
military role.78 By "hiding behind disaster relief,"79 President
Bush avoided the issue of the U.S. helping to disarm the Ser-
bian aggressor. He also refused to lift the arms embargo on
Bosnia.
One plausible explanation for the failure of the U.S. to form
an effective policy against Serbian aggression is the pro-Serbian
orientation of Lawrence Eagleburger and Brent Scowcroft,
President Bush's principal advisors on Yugoslavia.
Eagleburger, a former Yugoslav ambassador, and Scowcroft,
also formerly connected with the Yugoslav embassy, have long-
74 David Binder, No U.S. Action Seen on Prison Camps, N.Y. TniEs, Aug. 4,
1992, at A6.
75 Don Oberdorfer and Helen Dewar, Clinton, Senators Urge Bush to Act on
Balkans, WASH. PosT, Aug. 6, 1992, at Al.
76 Clifford Krauss, U.S. Backs Away From Charge of Atrocities in Bosnia
Camps, N.Y. TnMEs, Aug. 5, 1992, at A12.
77 Oberdorfer, Bush Shifts Toward Force to Aid Bosnia, WASH. PoST, Aug. 7,
1992, at Al.
78 Michael R. Gordon, Limits of U.S. Role: White House Is Seeking to Mini-
mize Any Use of Military in Balkan Conflict, N.Y. Tzms, Aug. 11, 1992, at A6.
79 Margaret Thatcher as Churchill, N.Y. Tmms, Aug. 11, 1992, (editorial), at
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standing diplomatic, personal, and business ties with Belgrade
and reportedly describe themselves as part of the "Belgrade Ma-
fia," a government apparatus that includes Foreign Service of-
ficers, experts, and intelligence analysts.8 0 It is suggested that
President Bush's prolonged silence on the reports of concentra-
tion camps in Bosnia reflected the influence of these advisors.
In fact, both Lawrence Eagleburger and Brent Scowcroft have
seriously misrepresented the situation in the Balkans to the
American public. Mr. Eagleburger, treating the victims and vic-
timizers as equal, has suggested all along that "we should wait
until they exhaust themselves and then move in," by which time
Bosnia would exist only in history.8 ' Only days after the revela-
tion of Serbian concentration camps, when the administration
found itself under great pressure to intervene militarily, both
Eagleburger and Scowcroft appeared on network television.
Mr. Scowcroft portrayed Serbia's invasion of Croatia and Bosnia
as a "civil war," despite U.S. recognition of both republics as
sovereign states. Mr. Eagleburger suggested that it was unnec-
essary to lift the arms embargo, since "there are already enough
arms there."8 2 Margaret Thatcher, appearing the same day on
network television, directly addressed this obfuscation, agree-
ing that there are indeed plenty of arms in Bosnia, but adding
that "they are in the hands of the aggressor "8 3 George Bush
and Margaret Thatcher, with their policies in opposition, have
been respectively compared with Neville Chamberlain and Win-
ston Churchill. 4
In addition to the administration's steadfast commitment
to minimize direct involvement in the Balkans, perhaps the
80 Saul Friedman, 'Belgrade Mafia' Seen Influencing U.S. Policy. Slow Re-
sponse tied to Scowcroft, Eagleburger, NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 9, 1992, at 4.
81 Supra note 17.
82 Don Oberdorfer, State Dept. Backtracks on Atrocity Reports, WASH. PosT,
Aug. 5, 1992, at Al. "Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Eagleburger... said the fighting in
the remnants of Yugoslavia was really a civil war, even though Mr. Bush an-
nounced last week that he would open diplomatic relations with Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Croatia, and Slovenia." Andrew Rosenthal, Allies Inch Closer to Bosnia
Aid Pact. Agree on Strong Words, but Differ on Strong Actions, N.Y. TimEs, Aug.
10, 1992, at AS.
83 This Week With David Brinkley: Interview with Margaret Thatcher (ABC
television broadcast, Aug. 9, 1992).
84 Lewis, Yesterday's Man, N.Y. Tnws, Aug. 3, 1992, (editorial), at A19. See
also supra note 79.
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most consistent feature of the U.S. policy towards former Yugo-
slavia has been its inconsistency. The administration has alter-
nated between flurries of activity and virtual disengagement.8 5
On each occasion that the White House or State Department
has hinted at the possibility of military intervention, it has
quickly backtracked, undoubtedly to the relief of the Serbian
leadership.
By continuous misassessment of the problem of former Yu-
goslavia and Eastern Europe, the U.S. has forfeited an historic
opportunity to foster European stability and security in the
post-Cold War era. In August 1992, George D. Kenney resigned
from the State Department, prompted by frustration over a pol-
icy primarily consisting of rhetoric, but practically "ineffective"
and "counterproductive." Mr. Kenney further charged that U.S.
reliance on repeated cycles of fruitless EC-mediated negotia-
tions was a "charade" whose outcome was known in advance.86
C. The Ineffectiveness of the UN and EC
The EC and UN role in mediating the conflict in former Yu-
goslavia offers an example of how, by analogy, a physician can
worsen the course of a disease by inappropriate intervention.
This conflict could have been prevented, but instead was exacer-
bated by incompetent international meddling. In the first
months, Serbian attacks were more limited and cautious. Pos-
sibly, Serbia was constrained by the perception that the post-
Gulf War world community possessed an efficient mechanism to
stop naked aggression, as was shown in Iraq. However, a cho-
rus of subsequent announcements that the EC, Western Euro-
pean Union, UN, and U.S. were proposing only negotiations,
but not military intervention, emboldened Serbian aggression.
The hesitancy of foreign powers to intervene would not have
been so problematic, if there were not an arms embargo freezing
the military imbalance in favor of Serbia. Although the EC did
recognize Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in early
1992, the arms embargo on these countries was maintained in
clear violation of their inalienable right to self-defense. As Ser-
bian aggression escalated, the EC continued to negotiate dozens
85 Binder, Bush Policy on Yugoslavia Has Fluctuated, N.Y. TndEs, July 28,
1992, at A10.
86 Binder, supra note 74.
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of meaningless cease-fires, equally blaming the aggressors and
victims. Through thirty-nine toothless cease-fires, brokered by
Lord Peter Carrington (a former business partner of Slobodan
Milosevic), Serbia predictably expanded the war front, using
each cease-fire to reposition troops and artillery for subsequent
attack. Lord Carrington's ultimate resignation from the leader-
ship of these sham EC "peace conferences" was long overdue, 7
but certainly too late to reverse the tragedy, which insightful
diplomacy could have prevented.18
A further demonstration of international ineffectualness
has been the unconstructive presence of the UN peacekeeping
force, UNPROFOR, which has functioned as Serbia's silent
partner, aiding in the achievement of Serbian war aims. UN
forces became de facto "caretakers" of Serbian-controlled Croa-
tian territories, maintaining the status quo and preventing Cro-
atian forces from re-establishing control over their own land.
This arrangement freed Serbian irregulars to move to the war
front in Bosnia. Indeed, UNPROFOR soldiers have been ob-
served unprofessionally fraternizing with Serbian forces "be-
hind Serbian lines."89 Moreover, UN forces have been
successfully coerced to assist in "ethnic cleansing," conducting
expelled civilians to "safety," because Serbian forces had
threatened to otherwise kill them. In the parts of Slavonia
under Serbian control, ethnic cleansing has virtually eliminated
all non-Serbs, including Hungarians, Ukrainians, and
Slovaks.90 In violation of Serbia's agreement with the UN, Ser-
bia has never complied in disarming the Serbian irregulars in
Croatia. Even with UNPROFOR stationed in Croatia, Serbian
forces have never ceased their daily shelling of Croatian cities
from Serbian-occupied regions. According to UN Undersecre-
tary Marrack Goulding, UNPROFOR observers "are not there
to physically prevent the shells from being fired."91 Rather,
87 Crossette, Europe's Envoy in Yugoslav Crisis Quits, N.Y. Tmms, Aug. 26,
1992, at A8.
88 Norman Stone, Blame the Somnolent Man of Europe for the Yugoslav Hor-
ror Show, Tim SUNDAY Timms (London), May 31, 1992, at Features.
89 Eyewitness testimony of Judy Darnell, R.N., an American nurse who volun-
teered in the medical corps on the Croatian front lines. Her written statement is
available with the author upon request.
90 Cviic, supra note 3.
91 Harden, Relief Plane Crashes Approaching Sarajevo, WASH. PoST, Sept. 4,
1992, at A27.
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their purpose is to, "... take notes and file reports when the
weapons are used."92 In a revealing statement, the military
commander of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo "hinted broadly... that
the reason he and other UN officials do not publicly point the
finger at the Serb side for shelling civilians is fear of retaliatory
attack on his troops."9 3 Since the UN mandate has forbidden
UNPROFOR to employ force to defend the civilian victims of
Serbian aggression, continued expulsions of civilians by the
Serbs have proceeded under direct UN observation. 94
92 I&
93 Id.
94 Documentation of the expulsion of thousands of Croats from UN protected
zones within Croatia is available from the Office of UNPROFOR, Zagreb, Croatia.
Telephone: 011-38-41-443-927; FAX 011-38-41-452-002.
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